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Japan  is  about  to  change  its  system  of  legal  education.  His‐
torically  the  Japanese  legal  and  legal  education  systems  have  been 
influenced  by  their  German  counterparts.  In  April  2004  Japan  will 
introduce law schools.3 Many in Japan are asking whether there are 
elements of the American legal education system that might profita‐
                                                           
1 © James R. Maxeiner 2002. 
2 Adjunct Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law--Newark. J.D., LL.M., Dr. 
jur. (Munich). This is a slightly revised version of an address given March 9, 
2002 at the First Symposium on Law and Jurisprudence, Kansai University 
Osaka—Georg-August Universität Göttingen, New Challenges for Law and 
Jurisprudence. I would like to thank my colleagues at Kansai University for 
making possible my participation and all participants for welcoming me and my 
American comments. The address style is maintained in these remarks, which 
are subject to the limitations of time and format constraints of an address. Be-
cause materials cited may not be easily obtainable, I have quoted fairly fully in 
the footnotes. I have not used abbreviations in citing to periodicals. 
3 Akhiro Onagi, Juristenausbildung in Japan, Juristische Schulung 2002, 721, 
723. See Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice Sys-
tem Reform Council For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, 
June 12, 2001. 
2                     24 KANSAI UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF LAW & POLITICS (2003) 
bly  be  introduced  here.  I would  like  to  address  that  question  from 
the perspective not only of the American legal education system, but 
also  through  comparisons  to  the  German  system.  In  this  way,  the 
choices  available  to  Japan  are  clearer.  In  considering  both  the Ger‐
man and  the American systems of  legal education as possible mod‐
els,  it  is  important to realized that  there  is satisfaction with neither 
of  them  and  that  both  have  been  subject  to  considerable  and  con‐
tinuing criticism.4 
  Law  faculties  in  Japan  are  asking  whether  and  how  they 
should  remake  themselves  to  become  law  schools.  One  basic  issue 
has been framed in terms of whether such programs should be pro‐
fessional or general.5 One Japanese scholar put it pointedly: “[a] ma‐
jor  issue of  the proposed  reform  is whether  Japan  should adopt an 
American model law school, i.e., professional education at the gradu‐
ate level, while essentially doing away with the traditional Japanese 
method  of  teaching  law  at  university.”6  American  law  schools  are 
seen as having as their fundamental goal “to provide the training and 
                                                           
4 In Germany, in particular, the last thirty years have seen many reform propos-
als. See generally Bericht des Ausschusses der Justizministerkonferenz zur Ko-
ordinierung der Juristenausbildung für die Konferenz der Justizministerinnen 
und Justizminister vom 11. bis 13.6.2001 in Trier, Juristisches Schulung 2001, 
933, also available at 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/jm/landesjustizpruefungsamt/aktuelles/pdf/bericht.pdf; 
Filippo Ranieri, Reform der Juristenausbildung ohne Ende?, Juristenzeitung 
1998, 831. For an extensive review of one reform that was tested, see Juristen-
ausbildung—erneut überdacht: Erfahrungen aus der einstufigen Juristenaus-
bildung als Grundlage für eine weiterhin anstehende Reform (Heinz Giehring et 
al., eds., 1990). For the United States, see, e.g. Legal Education and Professional 
Development—An Educational Continuum,  (Report of the Task Force on Law 
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992, the “McCrate” Report). I 
am limiting my discussion to the existing systems. For a comparison that is still 
current, see Jürgen R. Ostertag, Legal Education in Germany and the United 
States—A Structural Comparison, 26 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
301 (1993). 
5 Yukio Yanagida, A New Paradigm for Japanese Legal Training and Educa-
tion—In Light of the Legal Education at Harvard Law School, 1 Asian-Pacific 
Law and Policy Journal, text at note 54 (2000), also available at 
http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/1/01.html. 
6 Koichiro Fujikura, Reform of Legal Education in Japan: The Creation of Law 
Schools Without a Professional Sense of Mission, 75 Tulane Law Review 941, 
942 (2001). 
               American Law Schools as Model for Japanese Legal Education? 3  
education  required  for becoming an effective  legal practitioner,  i.e., 
the institutions provide a ‘professional legal education.’”7 
  It  is  not  my  intention  to  tell  Japanese  jurists  to  adopt  the 
American  or  the  German model.8  Indeed,  Japan  could  hardly  adopt 
either. Whatever Japan does do will be distinctively Japanese. What I 
would like to do is to discuss the professional character of American 
law  schools  in  the  context  of  a  comparison  with  German  legal  in‐
struction. My focus is on differences in the hope that these compari‐
sons will help clarify thinking about  the choices available to  Japan.9 
That  comparative  perspective  leads me  to  suggest  that  before  one 
considers  using  the  American  legal  education  system  as  model  of 





  An  American  comparativist,  John Henry Merryman,  percep‐
tively noted that examination of legal education in society is “a win‐
dow on  its  legal  system.”  It  tells  us much about  “what  law  is, what 








 The German  legal  education  system  trains  judges  (and  inci‐
dentally lawyers) to find legally correct answers; the Ameri‐
                                                           
7 Yanagida, supra note 5.  
8 Cf. Mark Levin, Legal Education for the Next Generation: Ideas from America, 
1 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal (2000), also available at 
http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/1/03.html  (taking great care to avoid preaching to 
Japanese colleagues). 
9 Unfortunately, I am not in a position to make comparisons directly to the Japa-
nese system. 
10 Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison, 27 Stanford Law Review 
859 (1974), reprinted with a prefatory note in Merryman, The Loneliness of the 
Comparative Lawyer at 53 (1999). Citations here are to the reprint. 




to  train  its  judges  and  is  funded by  the  State;  the American 








train civil  servants  for  the State.11 All persons who wish  to become 




role  of  the German  judge  is  to  determine  facts,  to  apply  the  law  to 





                                                           
11 See Reinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in 
Introduction to German Law 28 (W. Ebke & Matthew Finkin eds. 1996); Ra-
nieri, supra note 4, at 832 (“Das preußische Referendariatsmodell … prägt heute 
noch das deutsche Justiz- und Rechtssystem.“) 
12 Accord, Alfred Rinken, Einführung in das jursitische Studium 135 (1977). 
13 Zimmermann, supra note 11, at 21. The importance of this difference in legal 
thinking for legal education was noted nearly a century ago by the Austrian ju-
rist, Josef Redlich, in a study he was commissioned to make of American legal 
education: “To the German and Frenchman of our time, therefore, the law ap-
pears always in popular thought as the abstract rule, as the general principle, to 
which all individual relationships of the citizens are a priori and for its own sake 
subordinated. To the Englishman and the American, on the other hand, the law 
appears rather as the single case of law, as the single subjective suit, conducted 
by the regular judge, and depending only upon his ‘finding of the law.’” The 
Common Law and the Case Method in American University Law Schools, A 
Report to the Carnegie Foundation, Bulletin No. 8, at 36 (1914). 
               American Law Schools as Model for Japanese Legal Education? 5  
is  the  judge’s  duty  to  implement—and not  to make—political  deci‐
sions that have been made by others.14  
In  Germany,  law  students  learn  the  substance  of  the  law  at 
the university.15 Later, in the practical period of German legal educa‐
tion that follows university instruction, the Referendarzeit or intern‐
ship  period,  they  learn  the Relationstechnik  of  relating  facts  to  law 
and of crafting judgments. Judges as classroom teachers didactically 
teach classes  that  lay out  the  fundamentals of  this  technique, while 




ings  to determine  facts,  and how  to  justify  in  legal  judgments  their 
correct  determinations  of  how  law  applies  to  particular  cases.16  In 
short, they learn to do what a judge has to do.17  
                                                           
14 See Walther Richter, In welcher Weise empfielht es sich, die Ausbildung der 
Juristen zu reformieren?, Gutachten F zum 48. Deutschen Juristentag 23 (1970). 
See also James R. Maxeiner, U.S. “methods awareness” (Methodenbewußtsein) 
for German jurists,  in Festschrift für Wolfgang Fikentscher (Bernhard Großfeld 
et al., eds. 1998), at 114; James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German 
and American Antitrust Law: A Comparative Study  (1986); James Maxeiner, 
Rechtspolitik und Methoden im deutschen und amerikanischen Kartellrecht: 
eine vergleichende Betrachtung (1986). 
15 Compare Merryman, supra note 10, at 67 (“The truth is known by the profes-
sor and is communicated to the students.”). 
16 Professor Fikentscher has explained it this way: in the university students 
learn the “non-litigious opinion style” and in the internship period the “litigious 
opinion style”. (Stil des unstreitigen Gutachtens and Stil des streitigen Gutach-
tens respectively). Interns learn to handle cases with varying sets of facts and 
subject to different claims, objections, replications, etc. They put the many dif-
ferent relevant non-litigious opinions into one litigious opinion from which they 
then extract a judgment: “the judge renders a decision,’ a judgment, and this 
decision is the litigious opinion turned upside down, namely, beginning with the 
outcome, continuing with the legal rules that support the claims, objections, re-
joinders,, and duplicas, and ending with the subsumption. This is presented 
claim by claim, objection by objection, rejoinder by rejoinder, duplica by du-
plica, the whole judgment being arranged by claims. By contrast, as has been 
said, the non-litigious opinion starts with an open question: Could the plaintiff 
have this claim?, continues with the subsumption, and ends with a ‘therefore.’” 
17 German law requires that to become lawyers, candidates must establish their 
suitability to be judges (Befähigung zum Richteramt). The German Lawyers’ 
Association challenges this requirement as an anachronism. See Bericht, supra 







prenticeship  system  continued  alongside  the  university  system  for 





  In  the  United  States  the  German  view  that  the  role  of  the 
judge  is  to  apply  law  to  facts  is  rejected.19  Americans  legal  profes‐
sionals  see  the  legal  system  instrumentally,  that  is,  as  a  system  for 




shaping  of  the  law,  the  facts,  and  the  judgment  of  the  dispute.20  In 
recent  years,  the  lawyer  has  come  to  be  seen  as  “social  engineer;” 
                                                                                                                                    
note 4, at 29-30. The significance of dispensing with this requirement should not 
be understated.  As Professor Raiser recently observed, the German judge is 
seen to stand above the parties, to be neutral, to not work for money, but self-
lessly for truth and justice. The attorney, on the other hand, has a more compli-
cated: to work in the client’s interests and for justice. Thomas Raiser, Reform 
der Juristenausbildung—Förderung von Beratunds- und Gestaltungsaufgaben 
als Ziel der Juristenausbildung, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 2001, 418, 422. 
18 See generally Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from 
the 1850s to the 1980s (1983); Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Training for the Public 
Profession of the Law: Historical Development and Principal Contemporary 
Problems of Legal Education in the United States, Carnegie Foundation Bulletin 
No. 15 (1921). 
19 See, e.g., Edward Levi, Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1 (1949) (“It is im-
portant that the mechanism of legal reasoning should not be concealed by its 
pretense. The pretense is that the law is a system of known rules applied by a 
judge; the pretense has long been under attack.”); Lawrence M. Friedman, 
American Law: An Introduction 85 (1984) (American legal realists “sneered at 
the idea that the way to decide cases was by logical deduction from preexisting 
cases and rules”). 
20 See Maxeiner, U.S. “methods awareness, ” supra note 14. 
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that  view  is  said  to  predominate  among  law  professors.21  Judges 
revel in the role of making political decisions.22 
  The  American  case  method  of  legal  instruction  trains  stu‐
dents to  identify a precise point  in controversy and to argue for re‐






in  itself.24  A  German  student  exposed  to  examinations  in  both  sys‐
                                                           
21 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 
Columbia Law Review 723, 773 (1988) (American law school professors have a 
“deep-rooted belief that lawyers are social engineers”); Michael P. Schutt, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Decline of the American Lawyer: Social Engi-
neering, Religion, and the Search for Professional Identity, 30 Rutgers Law 
Journal 143, 176-77 (1998) (“A century after Holmes, however, in the midst of 
the celebrated “crisis” in the legal profession, the position of the American law-
yer as social engineer extraordinaire was taken for granted to a greater extent 
than ever by the legal elite—the bench and the academy.”) 
22 See, e.g., Charles E. Wyzanski, Whereas—A Judge’s Premises 6  (1965). See 
generally Mary Ann Glendon, The Ways and Tastes of Magistrates in A Nation 
Under Lawyers 111-73 (1994). 
23 Nearly a century ago Redlich perceptively captured the essence of this 
method: “Under the old method law is taught to the hearer dogmatically as a 
compendium of logically connected principles and norms, imparted ready made 
as a unified body of established rules. Under [the case method] these rules are 
derived, step-by-step, by the students themselves by a purely analytic process 
which forbids a priori acceptance of any doctrine or system either by the teacher 
or by the hearer. In the former method all law seems firmly established and is 
only to be grasped, understood and memorized by the pupils as it is systemati-
cally laid before them. In the latter, on the other hand, everything is regarded as 
in a state of flux; on principle, so to speak, everything is again to be brought into 
question. Redlich, supra note 13, at 13. 
24 Richard Stith, Can Practice Do Without Theory? Differing Answers in West-
ern Legal Education, 80 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 426, 433 
(1994).  (“An excellent student is one who can argue either side of a case with 
equal facility, who is trained to be a ‘hired gun’.”) This (as well as other aspects 
of the litigation system) helps explain two other features of American legal life. 
(1) The party with the better lawyer should win. (2) Counseling clients is not so 
much about whether particular action is within or outside law, but about who 
might argue that the proposed action is improper and whether they would have a 
colorable claim. 
8                     24 KANSAI UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF LAW & POLITICS (2003) 
tems picks  up  on  the  obvious  differences:  in America,  students  are 
taught  to  identify  and  make  arguments  (“issue  spotting”);  in  Ger‐
many, they learn to decide cases.25 
American  legal  methods  are  taught  principally  in  the  first 
year  of  law  school,  which  is  the  pride‐and‐joy  of  American  law 
schools.  The  courses  are  almost  always  the  same:  contracts,  torts, 













of  training  should not  be  taken,  however,  to  imply  success  in  itself 
                                                           
25 See, e.g., Nihls Behling, “St. Louis Diary: A German Student’s Tale about 
Academic Life in the United States,” on the Internet on December 20, 2001 at 
http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/gast/slu-diary/, who writes: “The style of the ques-
tions in the essay section was pretty much comparable to the stile of German 
essay exam questions, with one big difference though. While in Germany stu-
dents are required to put themselves into the position of judges and consequently 
solve the problems of the case, here students have to put themselves in the posi-
tion of attorneys. Therefore, a typical question would be: Imagine you are A’s 
counsel. How will you advise your client in this situation? What defenses will 
the other side possibly raise? Accordingly, the answer does not call for a lengthy 
development of the legal questions, but rather requires to precisely spot the is-
sues of a case, and to state the applicable rule together with a short reasoning.” 
When I mentioned this to one student recently, he responded that he was taught 
not to find answers, but to argue that there are none. 
26 This was the predominant view already a century ago. See Redlich, supra note 
13, at 24-25. Not all law students believe that they are being taught to think like 
lawyers. See Alan Watson, Legal Education Reform: Modest Suggestions, 51 
Journal of Legal Education 91 (2001). Watson inclines to agree with the skepti-
cal students. In any case, when this is repeated in second and third year 
courses—as it frequently is—it is incredibly boring. 
27 Redlich, supra note 13, at 37. 
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providing  all  practical  training.  Although  there  is  no  such  legal  re‐
quirement,  the  reality  is  that  many,  perhaps  most,  young  lawyers 










course  of  studies  offered  to  them  anticipates  that.  The majority  of 
students do eventually become legal professionals. What this means 
for the Japanese discussion is that it would be wrong to consider one 
foreign  model  more  “professional”  than  another.  Introducing  fea‐
tures from one model or the other should not be regarded as “more 
or less” professional. 
The  oft‐observed  difference  between  legal  education  as 
“graduate”  education  in  America  as  opposed  to  “undergraduate” 
education  in Germany  is off‐the‐mark.29  It  fails  to  take  into account 
differences  in  the  respective  secondary  and  higher  education  sys‐
tems.  The  German  gymnasium  has  a mission  similar  to  that  of  the 
American  college.  The  average  Gymnasium  graduate  is  likely  to  be 
about as well prepared for his or her professional legal education as 
is  the  average  American  college  graduate.30  Consequently,  I  do  not 
                                                           
28 Another development that may have helped law school education win out was 
the contemporaneous demise of the complicated forms of pleading in litigation. 
Pleading had some similarities to German-style subsumption. 
29 That Americans frequently make this distinction may be because this distinc-
tion was important in the history of American legal education. High school 
graduates in the USA were not ready for legal studies and so law schools sought 
students with some college education and finally were able to insist on under-
graduate degrees. In support of this view, see Ostertag, supra note 4, at 315-20. 
For an argument contrary to this view, see John Henry Merryman, “Note on 
Legal Education,” supra note 10, at 51-52. 
30 See Joachim Hruschka, Gedanken zur amerikanischen Juristenausbildung, 
Juristenzeitung 1999, 455. The best American students may be better prepared 
than most of their German counterparts. As with so many comparisons between 
Germany and the U.S., performance levels in the U.S. are less standard and vary 
more than in Germany. Indeed, one could legitimately argue that German law 
10                     24 KANSAI UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF LAW & POLITICS (2003) 








I  now  turn  to  some  more  specific  aspects  of  professional 
education  in  American  law  schools.  These  are  aspects  of  American 
law schools  that  foreign observers often note or should note.  I can‐








sound—make  it  easy  even  for  native  English‐speakers  to  slip  from 









Referendarzeit  in  Germany.  The  practical  training  of  the  Referen­
darzeit is training in how one does a judge’s job. It may also be train‐
                                                                                                                                    
faculties, more than American law schools, take a “graduate” approach to educa-
tion. In Germany Lehr- und Lernfreiheit prevail. German university students are 
no longer children, but adults: they are Studenten not Schüler. It is up to them to 
direct their education. Accomplished students have an opportunity to work 
closely with an academic mentor on a substantial piece of original scholarship, 
i.e., a doctoral dissertation. In contrast, the American school treats students more 
as children. Attendance is taken; students want to be “spoon-fed” basic material; 
and, opportunities for substantial scholarship comparable to the German doctor-
ate are rare. 
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be problem‐solving  lawyers and  law‐making  judges. While  the mis‐













                                                           
31 To the extent it does provide such training, it is only training to argue legal 
points in appellate or motion practice. One practicing lawyer recently said to me 
that he learned nothing useful in law school. When I asked what he meant, he 
said that all that he had discussed were litigated cases. These were of only lim-
ited utility in his practice as a counseling lawyer. 
32 “[American legal education] is better because it has grander objectives: be-
cause it draws on the full time and energies of teacher and student; because it is 
concerned with human problems and their solution; because it engages students 
directly in the study and active solution within the legal order; because it dis-
plays a higher opinion of the student and demands more of him; and because its 
conception of the work of the professional lawyer—and accordingly of the mis-
sion of legal education to prepare persons for the profession—is a much richer, 
more demanding, and more realistic one.” Merryman, supra note 10, at 73. 
33 Thus us poor Americans who choose to study German law have more of a 
challenge than do Germans seeking to learn American law. There is some anal-
ogy to learning the respective languages: English, with its absence of cases and 
genders, it easier to learn than German! 
12                     24 KANSAI UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF LAW & POLITICS (2003) 




is  always  right.  Students who pay  substantial  tuition  are  not  inter‐
ested  in extending  their period of  study any  longer  than absolutely 
necessary. They know that there is no formal practical training after 
law school. If they are to become successful lawyers, such training as 
they  get will  come  in  law  school.  They  thus  largely  seek,  and  legal 
education  reformers  largely  propose,34  that  increased  resources  be 
allocated to more practical skills education (e.g., clinical legal educa‐
tion). Increasingly one sees such instruction. The student/customers 
in  most  American  law  schools  evaluate  classroom  performance  of 
their  professors.  After  each  course,  the  students  fill  out  evaluation 
forms about the performance of the professor. To a greater or lesser 





American  legal  education  is  principally  funded  by  private 





Law  schools  that  can  offer  their  students  the  best  faculty  and  the 
best facilities are the most sought after by student/customers. Since 
law  schools  need  take  only  so  many  students  as  are  necessary  to 
raise needed funds, they can choose to limit the total number of stu‐
dents.  According  to  Professor  Merryman,  American  law  schools, 
freed of the need to be “democratic” and of a politically imposed re‐
quirement to accept all qualified applicants, can  impose a “meritoc‐
racy”, where  the better  law  schools  select  only  the better  students. 
The result is, he observes, that the academic quality of student bod‐
ies tends to be stratified according to the national reputation of law 
                                                           
34 See, e.g., the most noted of more recent proposals for reform, the so-called 
“McCrate Report”, supra note 4. 
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schools.35  He  acknowledges  that  this  meritocracy  can  “compound 
social injustice.”36  
Thanks to high demand for legal education and control over 
enrollment,  the  better  off  American  law  schools  have  established 
conditions for study that impress foreign visitors. Compared to legal 
education in foreign universities, student faculty ratios are favorable, 
faculty  course  loads  are  light,  and  facilities  approach  the  palatial. 
Richer  schools  have  more  comfortable  facilities,  more  professors, 
more  courses  and  more  of  just  about  everything.  Rankings  of  law 
schools—once  almost  never  spoke  of—have  now  become  largely 
accepted measures of schools.37 Money  is,  in  fact, a significant com‐
ponent  in  the  most  widely‐used  ranking  of  law  schools.38  But  this 
competition has probably benefited even less well‐off schools. It has 
enabled  them  to  charge higher  tuition  to  their  students  to  keep up 
with  the  better  off  schools  or,  if  state‐supported,  to  get  additional 
funds from the state legislature. It has encouraged them to find spe‐
cial  niches  in  which  to  respond  to  demands  not  otherwise met  by 
wealthier schools. 
                                                           
35 Merryman, supra note 10, at 56. 
36 Merryman, supra note 10, at 57. Professor Fujikura has discussed how import-
ing American ideas without American money could lead to problems in the 
Japanese system that is more dependent on state funding. See Fujikura, supra 
note 6, at 945-46. 
37 The earliest substantial discussion of these rankings of which I am aware of 
was by a German-American law professor and appeared in Germany. See Walter 
O. Weyrauth, Hierarchie der Ausbildungsstellen, Rechtsstudium und Recht in 
den Vereinigten Staaten (1976) Now, such a comparison is a successful  publis-
hing venture. See U.S. News & World Report, Best Graduate Schools 2002 Edi-
tion (Washington: 2001). The book has spawned an internet site where one can 
find the up-to-date rankings. See www.usnews.com. Although American law 
schools officially disparage this ranking, those that do well do not refuse to par-
ticipate and seek to improve their standing, sometimes illicitly. See Dale Whit-
man, Doing the Right Thing, Newsletter [of the Association of American Law 
Schools] 1 (April 2002) (President of law school group describes such illicit 
steps). See generally Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S. News and World Report 
Law School Rankings are both Useful and Important, 51 Journal of Legal Edu-
cation 487 (2001). The concept of law school ranking has even been adopted in 
Germany. See Axel Westerwell, Die besten Universitäten für Juristen: Deutsch-
land—Österrich—Schweiz (1997). 
38 Described as “faculty resources” it accounts for 15% of the U.S. News & 
World Report ranking. See U.S. News & World Report, supra note 36, at 47. 
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Resources  certainly  do  matter.  Based  on  personal  experi‐
ences as a student in American law schools, in a German law faculty 

















ist  who  has  taught  in  America  many  years,  much  more  recently, 
came  to  the  same  conclusion.  He  believes  that  case  law  teaching 
means that students “are not given the framework of the law.”42 “The 
absence of  theoretical underpinnings  is a  fatal  flaw  in  the casebook 
approach.”43 According to Professor Watson, “Legal education in the 
United States is geared to making legal plumbers, not legal scholars, 
not  reflective,  philosophically  and  socially  attuned  practitioners.”44 
Other U.S.  born  critics  agree  that  law  is  an  “art”  or  a  “craft”.45  One 
                                                           
39 The case law method of instruction was an attempt to bring that kind of inter-
active learning to large classes. 
40 Stith, supra note 24, at 427.   
41 Redlich, supra note 13, at 41.  
42 Watson, Legal Education Reform, supra note 26, at 93. 
43 Alan Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer in the United States, in Alan Watson, Law 
Out of Context 140, 143 (2000) 140, 143. 
44 Id. at 148-49. See also Alan Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors, 
A Case Study in Conflict of Laws 96, 118 note 29 (1992) (“To an extent unpar-
alleled elsewhere, students are not exposed to systematic treatment of law, with 
clear-cut concepts, institutions, and rules, but are presented with individual 
cases, outside of a historical, doctrinal, legal context but against a background of 
social interests.”) 
45 E.g., Stith, supra note 24 , at 427. 
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German  student  in  America  observed  that  American  law  schools 










The  role  of  the  American  law  professor  is  that  of  trainer. 
Cynically  put,  it  is  to  train  “hired  guns”  or  “Hessians”.47 More posi‐
tively put, professors are expected to take as much or more interest 
in the development of their pupils as in the development of the law. 
Pupils  are  required  to  attend  class  and  professors  are  to  monitor 
that  attendance.  Professors  take  an  interest  in  and  to  an  extent  re‐
sponsibility for their pupils’ passing the bar exam. In Germany, law is 
a science. Legal science  is  the development of an objective  legal or‐
der.  It  is  as much  the  role of  the German  law professor  to help de‐
velop  the  ideal  legal order as  it  is  to educate  the professionals who 
operate  it.48  In any case, the sheer numbers of students would limit 
active  faculty  involvement with students. Where one does see close 
relationships between faculty and students  is  in  the scientific study 
of law, i.e., in faculty research and student dissertations.  
                                                           
46 Der Rechtskulturschock: Anpassungsschwierigkeiten deutscher Studenten in 
amerikanischen Law Schools, Juristische Schulung 1984, 92, 93. Just how effec-
tively they do that is itself a subject of dispute. The point is similarly debated in 
Germany. See, e.g., the dialogue Jurastudium heute – und morgen! between 
Bernhard Großfeld and Klaus Peter Berger in Betriebs Berater 1998, 1756 and 
2596, where Professor Großfeld challenges case-oriented education and Profes-
sor Berger supports it as practice-oriented. 
47 Stith, supra note 24 , at 433 (“An excellent student is one who can argue ei-
ther side of a case with equal facility, who is trained to be a ‘hired gun’.”) 
48 See, e.g., Horst Ehmann, Die Aufgabe der Zivilrechtslehrer, in Die Aufgabe 
der Juristenfakultäten, Festgabe für Otto Theisen, 11, at 34 (1996) (“Die Aufga-
be der Juristenfakultäten ist die Bewahrung, Verbesserung und Fortentwicklung 
des Rechts sowie die Ausbildung künftiger Juristen nach dem idealen Bilde un-
serer Zeit in der Hoffnung, daß die Schüler dieser Fakultäten in ihrem Berufsle-
ben ein wenig von den idealen Vorstellungen verwirklichen können, von den wir 
nur träumen.”) 




In  the early years of American  law schools,  scholarship was 
relatively  unimportant.  This  resulted  in  part  from  the  mission  of 
American  law  schools  and  in  part  from  the  nature  of  the  Common 
Law as a system of judge‐made law. Already Redlich in 1914 warned 
of  a  “certain disadvantage which  the  case  system possesses  for  the 
scientific  activity  of  law”.49  Since  the  judges  in  the  Common  Law 
world are the last word on the law, systematizing efforts comparable 
to  the  German  Civil  Law  tradition  of  codes  and  commentaries  are 
much more difficult. This kind of systematic development of the law 
















often  criticized  for  having  an  antipathy  to  practice.53 American  law 
                                                           
49 Redlich, supra note 13, at 50. 
50 Stith, supra note 24 , at 434.  
51 Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 84 (1995).  
52 Stith, supra note 24 , at 434. For a book length treatment of competing views 
of legal scholarship in the United States, see Arthur Austin, The Empire Strikes 
Back: Outsiders and the Struggle over Legal Education (1998). For an explana-
tion for foreign law students in the United States of the great variety of what 
counts as scholarship there, see Matthew A. Edwards, Teaching Foreign LL.M. 
Students about U.S. Legal Scholarship, 51 Journal of Legal Education 520 
(2001). 
53 According to Professor Glendon, “Legal scholars, of all intellectual persua-
sions, have never been more disdainful than they are at present concerning legal 
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school  faculty  who  teach  practice‐oriented,  practical  skills  courses 
are often relegated to second‐tier status.  
American law professors are generally selected because they 
did  well  in  elite  law  schools.  They  are  “very  smart,”54  but  are  not 
necessarily wise. They are chosen, an American comparativist notes, 
for  “mere  brilliance.”55  They possess,  a  critic  observes,  “not  knowl‐
edge  but  intelligence.”56  Their  selection  has  a  standard  path:  good 
school marks in one of a small number of elite law schools, followed 
by a year or two working as an assistant to a judge, the higher up in 
the  judicial  hierarchy  the  better  (“clerkship”),  followed  by  at most 
one or two years in some kind of legal practice.57 
American  law professors  are normally not  selected because 
of scholarship, either of the doctrinal or the social science kind. The 
career  path  just  mentioned  scarcely  allows  for  it.  Clerking  for  a 
judge—the  most  common  background  these  days—does  not  train 
one  in  the  systematic  study  of  the  law,  but  in  decision  of  specific 
points  in  issue.  There  is  no  counterpart  to  the  German Dr.  jur.,  let 
alone  to  a  Habilitationsschrift.  Although  in  most  departments  of 
American  universities,  a  doctoral  degree  requiring  closely  super‐
vised academic work with a distinguished mentor is the rule, it is not 
in the law schools.58  
                                                                                                                                    
traditions, nor more detached from the practice of law.” Supra note 22, at 178. 
See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Edu-
cation and the Legal Profession, 91 Michigan Law Review 34 (1992); Harry T. 
Edwards, Another ‘Postscript’ to ‘The Growing Disjunction between Legal Edu-
cation and the Legal Profession,’ 69 Washington Law Review 561 (1994). 
54 Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer, supra note 43, at 162. 
55 James Gordley, Mere Brilliance: The Recruitment of Law Professors in the 
United States,” 41 American Journal of Comparative Law 367 (1993). 
56 Stith, supra note 24, at 428 (“and, often, wit.”). 
57 See Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer, supra note 42, at 161-62. Supreme Court 
clerks are the most sought after. Cf. Yukio Yanagida, supra note 5. See also Joel 
Seligman, The High Citadel, The Influence of Harvard Law School 123 (1978). 
58 See Posner, supra note 51, at 101: “The essence of most graduate education is 
not the courses and the exams, but the preparation for a career in scholarship 
that is afforded by the experience of writing a dissertation. Few law professors, 
even when they are practitioners of the new scholarship, have that experience.” 
See also Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer, supra note 43, at 162: “What [the new 
law professor] does not have is a rigorous training akin to a Ph. D. in law under 
a distinguished mentor. She has no publications, and she has nothing in the 
course of publication. She has no scholarly record. Whether she is likely to be-





In  contemplating  changes  in  a  legal  education  system,  one 
should  ask,  what  do  we  want  the  legal  system  to  do?  Part  of  that 
question is to ask how things would be different if we changed them?  







                                                                                                                                    
come a scholar in the sense understood in the arts and sciences is not even usu-
ally under active consideration by the faculty that hires her.” The usual require-
ment is only a J.D., or Juris Doctor, which while styled a doctorate, is not in any 
conventional sense. All 175 U.S. law schools combined bestow only a handful 
of true doctorates in law, the S.J.D., each year—less than twenty, typically. 
Stith, supra note 24, at 428. See also Robert J. Borthwick and Jordan R. Schau, 
Note: Gatekeepers Of The Profession: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law 
Professors, 25 University of Michigan Journal of Legal Reference 191, 212 
(1991) (noting the sharp decline in the last generation of new law professors 
with advanced degrees in law). One newly named professor, formerly a Su-
preme Clerk and Harvard Law Review President, was quoted in the law school’s 
alumni magazine as saying: “Part of the frustration in a busy law practice is that 
there’s often little time to think deeply and creatively about issues in the law. I 
can’t wait to do that as a professor.” 
59 According to Professor Watson, “The law review is the most bizarre feature 
of American law schools …” Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer, supra note 43, at 
155. The acme of American legal “scholarship” is membership on the Harvard 
Law Review, yet selection is based not even on academic grades, but on a com-
petition that is not determined by scholarship. See 2001-2002 Harvard Law Re-
view Membership Selection Policies, consulted on December 20, 2001 at 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/Policies.html (“The competition consists of 
two parts. The subcite portion of the competition, worth 40% of the competition 
score, requires students to perform a technical and substantive edit of an excerpt 
from an unpublished article. The case comment portion of the competition, 
worth 60% of the competition score, requires students to describe and analyze 
[within one week using provided materials] a recent U.S. Supreme Court or 
Court of Appeals decision.”)   
